On 9 July 2025, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights delivered its landmark judgement in Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia (Applications nos. 8019/16, 43800/14, 28525/20 & 11055/22), consolidating four inter-State applications concerning Russia’s annexation of Crimea (since February 2014), the intervention in Donetsk and Luhansk (since April 2014), the downing of MH17 flight (in July 2014), and Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine (since February 2022). This judgment is remarkable in many ways: from its essence and importance to the number of parties intervened.

Given its extensive length and argumentation, it is hardly possible to summarise all the conclusions and findings in one (or even several) posts. So please see below key points which are, in our view, worth attention.

1. Background and Procedural Issues

1. The Court mentioned several international organs and organisations that condemned the Russian aggression in the strongest terms. Notably, the Court highlighted the Council of Europe’s achievements in this field, specifically the establishment of the Register of Damage Caused by the Aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine and the preparation of draft legal instruments necessary to create a Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine. By doing so, the Court demonstrated that its decision is not a standalone action but rather part of the collective approach to holding Russia accountable for its serial acts of aggression.
2. In the spirit of adversarial procedure, the Court engaged in correspondence with the respondent state, although with no significant result. Apart from the short response of 5 March 2022, with “a number of bare assertions not supported by any evidence”, Russia did not provide any further submissions. The Court’s approach, however, shows that the fundamental principle of equality of arms shall be followed in any dispute, and thus, will be followed in future procedures within the compensation and Special Tribunal mechanisms dealing with the legal consequences of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine.

2. Temporal and Territorial Jurisdiction

3. Following its previous judgements (Pivkina and Others v Russia; Ukraine v Russia (re Crimea), the Court found its temporal jurisdiction to exist “no further than 16 September 2022”. As regards the facts that occurred later on, they may have been taken by the Court into account in the “overall context of the case”, that is, for the assessment of the violation of the Convention that took place prior to 16 September 2022, that is, the date until when the Convention was in force for Russia.
4. The Court confirmed that the Russian Federation’s effective control over the areas of the so-called Donetsk People’s Republic (“DPR”) and Luhansk People’s Republic (“LPR”) continued up until 16 September 2022. The initial existence of such control by the Russian Federation was established to have taken place since 11 May 2014 through deployment of Russian military forces, the provision of support to proxy militias, and the establishment of local administrations in occupied territories. (see paras. 694 and 905 of the Grand Chamber decision of 30 November 2022 in the case of Ukraine and Netherlands v Russia (Applications Nos. 8019/16, 43800/14 and 28525/20)).
5. Given the character and purpose of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine since 24 February 2022, the Court distinguished the present case from Georgia v Russia (II) and found that the former “exercised, through its de jure and de facto armed forces, authority and control over individuals affected by its military attacks up until 16 September 2022”. That means that Russia assumed obligations to guarantee the rights and freedoms under the Convention for the individuals who were under its control.

3. Interplay between Convention and International Humanitarian Law

6. As the violations of the Convention took place at the time of international armed conflict, the Court could not avoid taking into account the international humanitarian law, which both the applicant and third-party Governments claimed to have been relevant.  The Court treated the specific provisions of the international humanitarian law as an “interpretation tool” to determine the scope of the guarantees under the Convention, as opposed to a separate and independent source of international law when considering the applications in question. In particular, the Court underlined that an apparent conflict may exist  “where the use of force, although lawful under international humanitarian law, cannot be justified by reference to the exceptions listed Article 2 § 2”.However, based on the facts of the case the Court found  that “the impugned conduct was not compatible with international humanitarian law” as well as Article 2 of the Convention.

4. Court’s Findings in Respect of Certain Complaints

7. The Court examined violations under Article 2 (Right to Life), attributing the downing of flight MH17 directly to Russia’s provision and operation of the Buk missile system in the separatist-held territory, which resulted in 298 civilian deaths. Additionally, the Court concluded that indiscriminate shelling and extrajudicial killings in occupied areas formed a coherent strategy rather than isolated incidents. The Court further emphasised that Russia’s failure to conduct effective investigations compounded these violations.
8. The Court found that widespread and systemic torture and inhuman or degrading treatment within detention facilities controlled by Russian forces or their proxies violated Article 3 (Prohibition of Torture). These practices were recognised as manifestations of an administrative policy rather than isolated actions.
9. Under Articles 10 and 11 (Freedom of Expression and Assembly), the Court detailed Russia’s systematic suppression of dissent in occupied territories, including forced closures of independent media, harassment and detention of journalists, and violent dispersal of peaceful protests. These actions were identified as part of a coordinated effort to eliminate public opposition and restrict fundamental freedoms.
10. Additionally, based on Article 13 (Effective Remedy) taken in conjunction with  Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (Property Rights), the Court documented extensive expropriations of civilian property in Crimea without compensation or access to impartial legal remedies. This resulted in the deprivation of meaningful legal protection, rendering rights effectively unenforceable.

V. Conclusions and Insights

11. In its concluding observations, the Court underscored that state responsibility under the Convention cannot be circumvented by acting through non-state actors or puppet administrations. The Court established that any material, financial, or logistical support by Russia to such forces directly engaged its Convention obligations. Under Article 41, the Court prepared grounds for considering just satisfaction and provided clear guidance under Article 46, explicitly calling for Russia to release individuals unlawfully detained and to cooperate in establishing an international mechanism to ensure the safe return of children unlawfully transferred from Ukraine.
12. A fact worth attention is that the Court decided unanimously on all but one point, with the total number of violations amounting to eighteen.  This is a rare case in the ECHR practice where the judges unanimously found so many violations.

Above all, this ECHR decision sets a definitive precedent: fundamental human rights guarantees are non-derogable, and state responsibility attaches wherever actual power is exercised.

By Hanna Marunych and Vladyslav Petrovskyi