In our previous post, “The Expanding Reach of EU Judicial Oversight: Is CAS Arbitration Next?”, we explored whether the Court of Arbitration for Sport (the “CAS”) might soon face interference from the EU legal order. We noted that the growing judicial assertiveness of the Court of Justice of the European Union (the “CJEU” or the “Court”) could risk undermining both the legitimacy and finality of arbitral processes.

On 1 August 2025, that concern materialised. In its Grand Chamber ruling in Case C‑600/23 (RFC Seraing v FIFA, UEFA, URBSFA) (available here), the CJEU held that EU Member State courts may not treat CAS arbitral awards as binding – or even probative – when those awards touch on EU law but have not been subject to judicial review by a court within the EU judicial system. According to the Court, national rules granting res judicata effect to such awards conflict with EU law because they deny individuals the right to effective judicial review by Member State courts. The CJEU emphasised that while arbitration is generally permitted within the EU, it must align with the EU’s judicial framework and respect EU public policy.

The CJEU’s Reasoning on Seraing

The Seraing case involved a CAS award resulting from an arbitration imposed unilaterally by FIFA, as is the standard in sports disputes. The CJEU recognised that such mandatory arbitration may serve legitimate objectives such as ensuring consistent interpretation of sporting rules and uniform dispute handling. However, this legal autonomy cannot justify limiting rights and freedoms guaranteed by EU law, which form part of EU public policy.

According to the CJEU, to ensure effective judicial protection for athletes, clubs, and others involved in economic activities within the EU, CAS awards must be subject to meaningful judicial review in the EU. This review, the Court said, must allow courts to examine whether awards comply with EU public policy, including granting access to interim relief and enabling preliminary references to the CJEU, and must be available even if not foreseen by the national laws and/or the arbitration rules themselves. The Court clarified that:

• A direct legal remedy within the EU (such as an annulment action before a Member State court) is not strictly required if there is an equivalent indirect route – i.e., where a Member State court later seized of the matter can review the award’s compliance with EU public policy.
• This indirect review must be effective: Member State courts must be able to examine the interpretation and application of EU principles, assess legal consequences for the case, and review how the arbitral body classified the facts.
• Review cannot be limited to acknowledging inconsistency; courts must draw “all appropriate legal conclusions,” including awarding damages, ending infringements of competition law, or halting conduct contrary to the freedoms of movement.

In this regard, the CJEU was adamant that, where competition law or freedom of movement issues arise, courts must be able not only to recognise violations and award damages but also to halt unlawful conduct. The Court further held that national courts must proactively disapply any national laws or sports association rules that impede effective judicial protection of individuals:

Consequently, where the national provisions applicable to a given dispute may hinder the full effectiveness of the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, the national court or tribunal having jurisdiction must, if it is unable to interpret those national provisions in conformity with EU law, disapply them of its own motion. The power to do everything necessary, when applying EU law, to disregard a national provision or practice which might prevent directly effective EU rules from having full force and effect is an integral part of the role of a court of the European Union which falls to the national court responsible for applying, within its jurisdiction, those EU rules [citations omitted].

How This Differs From Eco Swiss and International Skating Union (ISU)

The CJEU’s jurisprudence on the intersection of arbitration and EU law has evolved significantly over the past decades, with Eco Swiss, International Skating Union (ISU), and now Seraing marking some important milestones in this development.

In Eco Swiss (1999) (available here), the CJEU addressed the interplay between international commercial arbitration awards rendered outside the EU and their enforcement within the EU legal order, particularly under the framework of the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the “New York Convention”). The CJEU acknowledged that arbitration awards made outside the EU remain valid and enforceable within the EU, provided they comply with the procedural standards of the New York Convention. Thus, the enforcement of such awards could be refused if enforcement would violate EU public policy, which includes competition law. Thus, according to Eco Swiss, public policy acted as a safeguard at the enforcement stage when the award is brought before an EU court. The CJEU essentially introduced a “second-eyes” mechanism, where an EU court would conduct a review of the award’s compliance with EU law at the point of enforcement. This review, however, was limited in scope and timing: courts would not undertake a detailed reassessment of the arbitral tribunal’s fact-finding or legal analysis but would intervene only to the extent necessary to protect public policy by refusing enforcement of arbitral awards that conflicted with EU public policy.

In the 2023 International Skating Union (ISU) judgment (available here), the CJEU adopted a more interventionist stance, holding that the ISU’s requirement for disputes to be resolved exclusively before the CAS, with appeals only to the Swiss Federal Supreme Court, created a “legal black hole” by excluding access to courts within the EU legal order that could conduct a full review of EU-law compliance and, if necessary, make a preliminary reference to the CJEU under Article 267 TFEU. Because the Swiss Federal Supreme Court’s review is confined to narrow public-policy grounds under Swiss law, it could not ensure the effective judicial protection guaranteed by Article 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Thus, according to the ISU judgment, the CAS can review ISU decisions, provided that the review of CAS’s review “cover[s] the question whether those awards comply with […] EU public policy, which include[s] Articles 101 and 102 TFEU.” The CJEU further clarified that effective judicial protection requires timely judicial remedies capable of halting unlawful conduct or annulling infringing measures, especially in sectors like professional sport, and cannot be dispensed with damages.

The recent Seraing judgment takes this trajectory further, appearing to enhance the judicial scrutiny of CAS arbitration awards when EU law is implicated:

• Whereas Eco Swiss required only a theoretical possibility to invoke public policy defences during enforcement, Seraing mandates that EU courts have an effective, substantive, and potentially intrusive ability to review arbitral awards involving EU law. This could include fact-finding and assessment of the interpretation and application of EU law by the tribunal.
• Seraing goes beyond enforcement to say that even the res judicata and probative value of CAS awards within other EU legal proceedings can be challenged if the award hasn’t been subject to meaningful judicial review consistent with EU public policy.
• The Court highlights that Member State courts must be able to grant interim relief and take proactive measures—such as suspending or annulling conduct violating EU law – not merely recognise breaches after the fact. This appears to be a stronger intervention than the limited review under Eco Swiss.
• On the other hand, in principle, Seraing specifically targets mandatory arbitration systems like CAS, where parties have little or no choice, and the protection of fundamental EU rights justifies a stronger judicial check.

In essence, the Seraing ruling builds on the foundations laid by Eco Swiss and ISU. It appears, however, to move away from the defensive, enforcement-focused public policy review of Eco Swiss towards a more active, comprehensive judicial supervision model. At the same time, it concretises the ISU principle that private dispute resolution mechanisms, including arbitration, must operate under the watchful eye of EU courts to guarantee fundamental rights and adherence to EU law. This evolving jurisprudence reflects the CJEU’s growing determination to prioritise effective judicial protection and the integrity of the EU legal order, even at the cost of restricting the traditional autonomy and finality of arbitration tribunals, particularly in mandatory arbitration settings like sports. While the new standard is yet to be tested, it appears to mark a shift from a defensive, enforcement-only approach to a proactive, holistic review of arbitral awards involving EU law.

The Fundamental Rights Angle and the ECHR Link

Although the CJEU’s Seraing judgment does not explicitly refer to the European Court of Human Rights (the “ECHR”) decisions on CAS arbitration – such as the landmark Mutu & Pechstein v Switzerland cases – the parallels are striking. The ECHR has consistently held that compulsory CAS arbitration must respect fundamental procedural rights, and that athletes subject to mandatory CAS arbitration are not denied effective judicial protection.

In Seraing, the CJEU appears to translate these human rights concerns into the EU’s constitutional framework, notably Article 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, which guarantees the right to an effective remedy and a fair trial within the EU legal order. The Court’s insistence that CAS awards must be subject to meaningful judicial review within the EU safeguards these fundamental rights when arbitration is mandatory and binding. This connection helps explain why Seraing’s reasoning may be more narrowly tailored to mandatory arbitration regimes, such as CAS in sport, where individuals have little or no choice but to accept arbitration as a condition of participation.

Tension with the New York Convention?

In her Opinion of 16 January 2025, Advocate General (the “AG”) Tamara Ćapeta had questioned whether CAS awards fall within the scope of the New York Convention. According to the AG, the application of the New York Convention presupposes free and voluntary agreements to arbitration; CAS jurisdiction, however, is mandatory.

While the CJEU did not specifically examine this reasoning, it opined as follows:

… the [New York Convention] … which is not binding on the European Union, but to which all the Member States and, … the Swiss Confederation are parties, also provides for judicial review of arbitral awards as regards consistency with public policy. … [A]lthough any State party to it must recognise the existence and the authority of foreign arbitral awards made pursuant to an agreement under which natural or legal persons have undertaken to submit to arbitration all or part of any disputes which may arise between them concerning a particular legal relationship, that obligation goes hand in hand with the obligation, for such a State, to ensure that the persons concerned have the possibility of obtaining from the national court or tribunal having jurisdiction, either at those persons’ request or of the court’s or tribunal’s own motion, a review of those awards for consistency with that State’s public policy. As regards the Member States, the latter obligation itself goes hand in hand with the obligation to ensure that those persons have the possibility of obtaining a review of those awards for consistency with EU public policy.

While Eco Swiss has already used the New York Convention’s public policy provision to insert EU law into enforcement and recognition proceedings, Seraing could be seen as further pushing its boundaries:

• The New York Convention allows refusal of enforcement on public policy grounds without reassessment of the merits, but Seraing demands more than a simple possibility of refusal. It requires effective, substantive judicial review of awards touching on EU law – going beyond enforcement to potentially include challenges to the evidentiary and binding effect of awards in EU courts.
• Seraing warns against any national law or practice that gives foreign awards automatic or unconditional res judicata or probative effect without public policy review. If a Member State’s law gives foreign awards unconditional evidentiary or res judicata effect without allowing public policy review, that would now appear to conflict with EU law, even if New York Convention obligations would otherwise suggest deference.
• In practice, this means EU law takes primacy, and the New York Convention’s deference principle must bend to accommodate the EU Charter and Article 19 TEU. The conflict is therefore manageable, but only if Member States treat New York Convention enforcement as subject to a robust EU-public-policy review.

To Move or Not To Move: The Seat of CAS Arbitrations

As evident from both the ISU and Seraing judgments, the main issue at hand is not with the CAS itself, but rather with the courts tasked with reviewing CAS awards. Indeed, the Seraing judgment does not explicitly mandate that CAS arbitrations must be seated within the EU. However, it sets out clear criteria that effectively shape the practical implications of arbitration seat choices concerning EU law compliance and judicial oversight. Two potential pathways emerge from the Court’s reasoning:

1. CAS Moves Its Seat Within the EU: If CAS arbitrations – or any sports arbitration – are seated in an EU Member State, the national courts of that state have direct jurisdiction to conduct judicial review of arbitral awards. This includes the power to annul or modify awards that conflict with EU public policy. Such seat choice ensures that EU courts can engage immediately and effectively in safeguarding fundamental rights and maintaining the primacy of EU law. This approach arguably aligns most closely with the CJEU’s emphasis on effective judicial protection.
2. CAS Remains Seated Outside the EU: Alternatively, CAS arbitrations may continue to be seated outside the EU – in Switzerland – where direct judicial review by an EU court is unavailable. Here, the critical moment for judicial oversight shifts to the enforcement or recognition of awards within the EU. The CJEU appears to assert that under this scenario, EU courts hearing enforcement proceedings must be empowered to undertake a comprehensive “second-eyes” review of the award’s conformity with EU public policy. This review must go beyond formalistic checks and potentially include substantive scrutiny of EU law compliance, fact-finding, and the ability to grant interim measures if necessary.

Effectively, the CJEU’s reasoning does not exclude extraterritorial arbitration seats, but it sets a high bar for compliance: EU courts must not be precluded from meaningful judicial scrutiny when EU law is implicated. Conversely, any system or national law that automatically grants unconditional res judicata or probative value to foreign awards without allowing for effective EU law review would be incompatible with EU law.

Practically, this puts pressure on CAS and parties to ensure that even arbitrations seated outside the EU have procedural mechanisms in place (or that EU courts have jurisdiction) to provide the necessary effective judicial protection, as required by the Seraing ruling. In other words, the CJEU seems to accept the Eco Swiss-style enforcement review as sufficient if it is genuinely open and effective – but it closes the door on any arrangement that deprives EU courts of that opportunity.

While the ultimate way forward remains uncertain, UEFA has already taken steps that could offer a workable solution. In 2024, UEFA amended its Authorisation Rules governing International Club Competitions (2024 ed.) (available here), including Article 16 on ‘Dispute Resolution’, which now contains the following provisions:

3. CAS shall primarily apply the UEFA Statutes, rules and regulations and subsidiarily Swiss law. The party filing the statement of appeal and/or a request for provisional measures, …, shall indicate in its first written submission to CAS whether the party accepts Lausanne, Switzerland, as seat of the arbitration or if the seat of the arbitration shall be in Dublin, Ireland, in derogation of Article R28 of the CAS Code. In the latter case, UEFA is bound by the choice of Dublin, Ireland, as seat of the arbitration and UEFA shall confirm its agreement to such seat ….

4. The decision of CAS shall be deemed to be made at the seat of the arbitration …. The CAS award shall mention the seat of the arbitration. The decision of CAS shall be final and binding to the exclusion of jurisdiction of any ordinary court or any other court of arbitration. This is without prejudice to the right of appeal of any party in accordance with the applicable law of the seat of the arbitration as well as the right to challenge the enforcement or recognition of a CAS award on grounds of public policy (which may include European Union public policy laws) in accordance with any applicable national or European Union procedural laws.

Article 63 of UEFA Statutes (available here), in turn, was modified to provide that “[A]ny party before CAS shall be entitled to raise mandatory provisions of foreign law in accordance with Article 19 of the Swiss [PILA], which may include European Union public policy laws.”

Thus, while disputes continue to be referred to the CAS, parties may choose the arbitration seat between Lausanne, Switzerland, and Dublin, Ireland – an EU Member State. Should the parties select Dublin, UEFA is bound to accept this choice, thereby subjecting CAS awards to the Irish High Court’s jurisdiction, which can, in turn, refer questions to the CJEU for preliminary rulings. Additionally, UEFA’s modification of Article 63 of its Statutes permits parties before CAS to invoke mandatory provisions of foreign law, including EU public policy, as recognised under Swiss law.

This development signals UEFA’s willingness to address the CJEU’s concerns as expressed in the ISU ruling by enabling a procedural framework where arbitrations potentially touching on EU competition law can be reviewed within the EU legal order. Although these changes currently apply only to disputes related to the Authorisation Rules and leave other UEFA regulations outside their scope, they represent a significant step toward reconciling the CAS’s traditional role as a specialised tribunal based in Switzerland with the EU’s requirements for effective judicial protection. In this context, UEFA’s amendments offer a promising compromise: they preserve CAS’s international arbitration model while allowing affected parties the option of an arbitration seat within the EU, and thus permitting EU courts to retain the capacity for meaningful judicial oversight. Whether UEFA’s approach will prove effective remains to be tested, as does CAS’s potential institutional decision to find ways to work around or adapt to EU requirements.

Balancing CAS Autonomy with EU Oversight?

Undoubtedly, the Seraing ruling raises significant questions about the limits of EU competence, the autonomy of arbitration, and the potential for legal fragmentation in a cross-border dispute settlement system which is already shaky in light of economic sanctions and politically motivated laws. While the Seraing ruling is yet to be tested, several points are worth keeping in mind:

• Arbitration is not inherently incompatible with the rule of law. Parties often choose arbitration precisely to avoid state interference and ensure expertise, confidentiality and neutrality – especially in highly specialised fields like sport.
• The CAS system, albeit imperfect, has long operated under a well-developed, globally recognised legal framework, with the Swiss Federal Supreme Court providing supervisory oversight to the extent permitted by the Swiss PILA.
• Would Seraing have been decided differently if CAS arbitration were voluntary? Potentially, yes. Much of the CJEU’s concern arises from the mandatory nature of CAS arbitration, which triggers stronger requirements for judicial protection under EU law. However, even in voluntary arbitration, enforcement within the EU would remain subject to public policy scrutiny, so judicial oversight could not be entirely avoided.
• Requiring EU judicial review for awards made outside the EU risks undermining party autonomy and clearly impedes enforcement of both intra- and extra-EU awards within the EU.
• The Seraing ruling risks undermining one of the most fundamental pillars of arbitration – finality. If awards involving EU law can be endlessly challenged in the already overloaded EU Member States’ courts, legal certainty and efficiency suffer.

Practical Impact on Sports Arbitration

Stakeholders in sports arbitration will now step into an increasingly uncertain legal environment. National courts in the EU may come under pressure to deny recognition or evidentiary weight to CAS awards involving EU law unless those awards have been reviewed by an EU court. This may trigger a rise in litigation in Member State courts (and the associated costs), increase unpredictability in enforcing contracts, and prompt changes to arbitration clauses to safeguard enforceability under EU law.

Effectively, the CJEU suggests that no arbitral award involving EU law can be immune from EU judicial scrutiny, even if the arbitration is seated outside the EU and governed by non-EU procedural law. Back in our earlier post, we flagged this risk: that expanding EU judicial oversight could destabilise long-standing private adjudicatory systems. The Seraing judgment confirms our concerns, as the Court has delivered a decision that may (unintentionally) undermine the credibility and functionality of international arbitration – especially for cross-border sports disputes.

Beyond Sport: The Broader Question

While Seraing specifically concerns sports arbitration before CAS, it raises a broader concern: has Pandora’s box now been opened for commercial arbitration as well? The precedent is familiar. Recall the CJEU’s Achmea ruling: although it addressed just one bilateral investment treaty, it ultimately paved the way for challenges to the entire system of investor-state arbitration within the EU.

Although commercial arbitration is not typically mandatory in the same way as CAS arbitration is, in reality, parties often have little to no choice, especially when dealing with contracts offered by dominant private entities. Moreover, in today’s digital economy, arbitration clauses are increasingly embedded in online platforms, from subscription services to accommodation bookings and car rentals. Users are often required to accept comprehensive arbitration agreements as a condition for accessing the service, with no room for negotiation. Will these types of arbitrations soon be subject to EU judicial scrutiny as well?

While we acknowledge the importance of fundamental rights and effective judicial protection, not every dispute touching on EU law demands CJEU scrutiny, and not every foreign arbitral system is inherently deficient. There is a need for restraint, legal clarity, and constructive dialogue to ensure that the protection of EU rights does not come at the cost of international legal cooperation.

We asked before: “Is CAS arbitration next?” It appears the answer is yes. The more pressing questions now are: is this the right direction, and what comes next?

By Maria Paschou and Alexey Pirozhkin